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t
Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3223
(U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-2071).
The interplay between citizenship statutes and the promotion of sex1
equality has always held an uneasy truce under Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. Prior to 1934, congressional citizenship statutes were strongly
biased in favor of the father-only foreign-born children of citizen fathers
could be considered U.S. citizens.2 Starting in 19403 and continuing in the
post-war 1952 overhaul 4 of the citizenship statute, Congress allowed the
pendulum to swing in the other direction-against citizen fathers-partly in an
attempt to limit citizenship claims from those "persons who would be a
potential liability rather than an asset.",5 Out-of-wedlock foreign-born children
with citizen mothers were granted automatic citizenship, 6 while out-of-
wedlock foreign-born children with citizen fathers had to fulfill a number of
requirements 7 to gain citizenship.
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2001.
1. Justice Scalia's dissent inJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) nicely lays out the
dichotomy between sex and gender.
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination rather than (as the
Court does) gender discrimination. The word "gender" has acquired the new and useful con-
notation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) dis-
tinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine to
male. The present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of feminin-
ity or masculinity (as far as it appears, effeminate men did not survive the prosecution's per-
emptories). The case involves, therefore, sex discrimination plain and simple.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This distinction will be followed here.
2. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104. The Acts of 1795, 1802, 1855, and 1874 all followed
this premise. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 823-825 (1971) charts this development. While these stat-
utes did not specifically address the issue of citizenship for children born out-of-wedlock, in practice
they were included as long as they were later legitimated by marriage. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 556 (1937).
3. Nationality Act of 1940, § 201(c), 54 Stat. 1138 (1940).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 309, 66 Stat. 238 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1409 (2000)).
5. H.R. Rep. No. 2396, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940).
6. INA § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409 [hereinafter Section 1409]. In part this pro-mother bias of the
1952 statute was also an attempt to reduce the problem of statelessness, as other nations at the time often
did not confer citizenship to the children of U.S. citizen mothers. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
39(1952).
7. While the foreign-born out-of-wedlock child of a citizen father is still a minor, she must be le-
gitimated, the father must acknowledge paternity, and the paternity must be acknowledged by a court.
Further, she must establish a blood relationship by clear and convincing evidence, the father must have
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zenship.
Since the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment in the late 1970's, theo-
rists have taken different approaches on how best to promote sex equality-
some arguing that statutes that rely on outmoded generalizations about sex
should not survive, 8 others promoting an approach of treating the sexes
differently. 9 Recently, in Nguyen v. INS, 10 the Fifth Circuit weighed in on this
debate by holding that the citizenship statute did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, and that its distinctions did correspond to natural differences
between the sexes and thus accomplished important governmental objectives."
Despite its reliance on Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Miller v. Albright
12
in according deference to this area of express Congressional power, the Fifth
Circuit underestimated the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard 1
3
under the Equal Protection Clause being applied in sex discrimination cases by
the Supreme Court and wrongly held that the statute survived heightened
intermediate scrutiny. Ultimately, however, the Fifth Circuit did stumble onto
a result that will likely be sustained by the Supreme Court-not because the
statute survives Equal Protection analysis, but due to the fact that the Court
will likely adopt the approach in Justice Scalia's Miller concurrence and hold
that the Court has no power to confer citizenship upon Nguyen. 14
Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in Vietnam in 1969 to an unmarried Viet-
namese-citizen mother, who abandoned him at birth. 15 His father, 16 Joseph
Boulais, is a U.S. citizen who raised Nguyen in Texas since 1975, when
Nguyen was three years old. Nguyen has been a lawful permanent resident
had the nationality at the time of the child's birth, and the father must agree in writing to support the
child until the age of 18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
8. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Humanism, Gynocentrism, and Feminist Politics, HYPATIA: J. OF
FEMINIST PHIL. (1985). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-546 (1996) ("'Inherent
differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but
not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportu-
nity."). These distinctions are considered unconstitutional under heightened or intermediate scrutiny.
See JE.B., 511 U.S. 127.
9. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997). More recent cases have likewise focused
on a more performative conception of sex. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For
a good overview of this issue in the race context, where the parallel would be to "status-sex" as "sex"
and "culture-sex" as "gender," see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, " 44
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991). Finally, Kristin Collins, Note, When Father's Rights are Mothers'Duties: The
Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L. J. 1669 (2000), provides a good over-
view of these issues in thz context of citizenship statutes.
10. 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3223 (Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-2071).
11. Id. at 535.
12. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). Miller is important to the analysis here because it involved a challenge to
the very same statutory provision that Nguyen is contesting. The case was decided on a third party
standing issue, leaving the constitutionality of INA § 309 open.
13. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
14. Miller, 523 U.S. 420, 453 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000).
16. In February 1998 a Texas district court issued Boulais an "Order of Parentage" establishing that
he is Nguyen's father. In December 1997 a DNA test also established Boulais' paternity. See id.
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since that time. 17 However, his father did not take the affirmative steps to
validate Nguyen's citizenship in the proper timeframe under the requirements
of Section 1409(a).18 In 1992, at the age of 22, Nguyen pled guilty to two fel-
ony counts of sexual assault, and was sentenced to prison for eight years.'
9
Three years later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted
deportation proceedings against Nguyen. This case arose from Nguyen and
his father's efforts to block his deportation on the grounds that he is a citizen of
the United States under a reading of the citizenship statute Section 1409(a) con-
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause.2'
An immigration judge first heard Nguyen's case in November 1996.22
During the hearing, Nguyen conceded that he was a not a citizen of the United
States and had committed the felonies of which he was accused. On this basis
the judge ruled in January 1997 that Nguyen was deportable. 23 Nguyen next
24appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Although Nguyen
filed a Texas district court "Order of Parentage" establishing Boulais' pater-
nity, the BIA dismissed Nguyen's appeal first on June 2, 1998, and a reconsid-
eration appeal on May 28, 1999. It cited Nguyen's failure to meet the require-
ments of Section 1409(a) and the mandates of Miller v. Albright.25 On June
30, 1999, Nguyen and Boulais filed an appeal from the BIA ruling with the
Fifth Circuit. 26 A habeas petition was also filed with the United States District
Court challenging the deportation order,27 but that action has been stayed
pending the final resolution of the Fifth Circuit appeal28 -now being consid-
ered at the United States Supreme Court.
29
The Fifth Circuit granted a motion by the INS to dismiss Nguyen's ap-
17. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
18. Immigration and Nationality Act § 309(a)(4) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2000)) re-
quires that paternity be established before the child reaches the age of 18. See supra note 7 for the other
requirements of § 1409.
19. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
20. Id. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1251 (a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (2000)) allows the INS to issue deportation proceedings against aliens con-
victed of two crimes involving moral turpitude or felonies. The INS proceedings against Nguyen began
on April 4, 1995.
21. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) held that the 14th amendment bars Congress from de-
priving native-born or naturalized U.S. citizens of their citizenship. The deportation ofa U.S. citizen
(such as Nguyen) would also logically be prohibited under this ruling. But see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 US
815 (1971) (allowing withdrawal of citizenship from foreign-born children of U.S. nationals who do not
fulfill a residency requirement).
22. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 531.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). The BIA characterized Miller as stating that "different proof require-
ments for the father, as opposed to the mother, did not represent an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection." See Brief for Petitioner, at app. 16a, Nguyen v. INS (No. 99-2071).
26. Nguyen's appeal was filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(5) (1994), which confers jurisdiction
on the U.S. Courts of Appeal to hear appeals of deportation orders. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
27. Nguyen v. Reno, Civ. No. H-98-2086 (S.D. Tex. filed July 2, 1998).
28. Nguyen, 208 F.3d 528.
29. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S.Ct. 29 (2000).
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peal. Writing for the panel, Judge Carl E. Stewart held that Section 1409(a)30
was constitutional, and that Nguyen did not meet the requirements for citizen-
ship described therein. 31 Because Boulais' "Order of Parentage" came nearly
ten years after Nguyen had reached the age of 18-the statutory threshold be-
fore which paternity had to be established under Section 1409-Boulais was no
longer able to pass his citizenship on to Nguyen.32 As a non-citizen, Nguyen
was subject to a statutory provision allowing aliens convicted of felonies to be
deported. 33 The Board of Immigration Appeals effectively exercised this op-
tion when it rejected Nguyen's final appeal on May 28, 1999.34 Moreover, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
199635 establishes that "there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an
alien who is... deportable by reason of having committed a criminal of-
fense . ,,36 Fifth Circuit precedent interprets this language to preclude juris-
diction to review Board of Immigration Appeal decisions. 37 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit panel concluded that as an alien, Nguyen's appeal was precluded
by the IIRIRA and the INS's motion to dismiss was proper.
The linchpin of the court's decision rests on its determination that Section
1409(a) is constitutional, under which Nguyen readily falls within the category
of "alien" and is deportable by statute.38 The panel conceded that statutes
premised on "outmoded generalizations about sex cannot survive heightened
scrutiny." 39 It then looked to the issue of third-party standing-critical in the
similar Miller v. Albright4 just two years ago-to establish what level of
scrutiny to apply to Nguyen's claim.4 1 Namely, Section 1409(a) does not cre-
ate sex-based distinctions among classes of children, only their parents. 42 The
issue of standing is important because children without third-party standing
43
and whose citizen parent is not a co-plaintiff are deemed unable to raise the dis-
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
31. Nguyen, 208 F.3dat 536; 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 20.
34. Nguyen, 203 F.3d at 531.
35. Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(4)(G), 110 Stat. 3009, 626-27, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 nt.
36. Id.
37. Lerma de Garcia v. INS, 141 F.3d 215, 216 (5th Cir. 1999). Terrell v. INS, 157 F.3d 806, 809
(10th Cir. 1998) also supports this notion.
38. See supra note 21.
39. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-46 (1996)).
40. 523 U.S. at 423.
41. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 533.
42. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1999).
43. Justice O'Connor's Miller concurrence notes that children affected by INA § 309 may only
address the sex discrimination claim of their parent through third party standing. Third party standing is
not applicable when there is no "'genuine obstacle' to the assertion of [the parent's] assertion of his own
rights that rises to the level of a hindrance." Miller, 523 U.S. at 447-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cit-
ing the three-part test for a litigant to assert the rights of another person in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991)). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (noting that third-party standing may




crimination claim raising intermediate or heightened scrutiny generally applied
to sex-discriminatory statutes. 44 Instead, they are only able to receive rational
basis review of the statute because it "irrationally discriminates between ille-
gitimate children of citizen fathers and citizen mothers." 45 But since Boulais
(the father) is a named party in addition to Nguyen, this issue of standing is not
determinative. The Fifth Circuit panel agreed, finding Boulais a proper party
to challenge the constitutionality of Section 1409 and implicitly endorsing a
heightened intermediate standard of review of the statute.
46
The panel's next step was to apply this heightened intermediate standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause to Section 1409(a). The statute
does in fact have a number of justifications beyond those purely resulting from
"outmoded generalizations" about the sexes. 47 The Fifth Circuit panel cited to
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Miller for a number of these rationales. 8 The
first is that it ensures reliable proof of a biological relationship between the
citizen parent and child.49 Justice Stevens argued that this is more relevant for
fathers because the blood relationship is not as evident for them as for mothers.
Moreover, the statutory limit of eighteen years to prove this relationship may
be envisioned as a means of guaranteeing that the paternity information is reli-
able.50 A third objective of the statute is to foster ties between the foreign-born
child and the United States by promoting a relationship between the minor
44. Miller, 523 U.S. at 451 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Terrell, 157 F.3d at 808, United
States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999).
45. Miller, 523 U.S. at 451. Given the fragmented nature of the opinion, it is difficult to state a
clear rule as to the Court's position on third party standing. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by
Kennedy, presents a bright line rule that clearly makes the difference in Nguyen. Even so, it is likely
that all seven of the other justices supported an even more relaxed standard for third-party standing, and
would have accorded it to Miller here. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 432, 455 n. I (Scalia, J., concurring); id.
at 473 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 534.
47. Id.
48. Id. A number ofjustifications for the statute exist, beyond the three focused on by the Fifth
Circuit Nguyen panel and Justice Stevens in Miller. Notably, Congressional hearings paid great defer-
ence to the issues of statelessness and dual nationality in writing the early versions of citizenship stat-
utes. See Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of
the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of Nationality: Hear-
ings before the House Comm. On Immigration and Naturalization, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1933)
(discussing the statelessness problem in the context of English/American marriages). See also To Re-
vise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States Into a Comprehensive Nationality Code:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., I st Sess. 43 (1945).
A third justification is simply that the birth and raising of children constitutes a real difference between
the sexes upon which a constitutional distinction can be made. See Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248
(1993) (noting that legislatures may require unwed fathers to establish a relationship with the child as a
condition of being treated on an equal plane with the mother); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(highlighting the different legal situations of unwed fathers and unwed mothers); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (establishing that a state may take into consideration under any standard of review
that an unwed father has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child); Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding distinctions based on real differences between
the sexes do not violate heightened intermediate scrutiny).
49. Miller, 523 U.S. at 436.
50. Id. at 437-38. Of course, much of the relevance of this point precedes modem DNA testing.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 19:525, 2001
child and its father through the process of establishing paternity. 51 All these
objectives the Stevens plurality opinion in Miller established as cogent enough
to meet even the heightened intermediate scrutiny of statutes that discriminate
by sex. 52 The Fifth Circuit panel likewise found the Section 1409(a) statute as
meeting this heightened intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny, and thus
rejected Nguyen's deportation appeal.53
Nguyen v. INSf 4 is important because it is an ideal test-case for the Su-
preme Court to reaffirm its commitment to the strong "exceedingly persuasive
justification" language of Virginia55 within the heightened intermediate level
of scrutiny accorded to sex classifications---even in an area such as immigra-
tion traditionally accorded great deference to Congress. 56 Whether Nguyen is
analyzed under the heightened intermediate scrutiny analysis accorded the
Section 1409 sex distinction concerns expressed by at least five members of
the Miller court 57 and the logical doctrinal progression of heightened scrutiny
from its roots in Reed,5 8 Frontiero,59 and Craig60 to the more recent United
States v. Virginia,61 or through the lens of Equal Protection analysis in Fiallo's
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" standard,62 both analyses point to a
heightened standard that Section 1409 simply cannot overcome. Moreover, the
progression of Equal Protection cases dealing with sex point to a standard that
51. Id.
52. Id. at 433-444.
53. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535.
54. Id.
55. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
56. Congress' plenary power over immigration and naturalization is indeed strong. Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, (1977), states that "[o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than" the political decisions that are part of deciding who should share in the privileges,
protections, and duties of citizenship. United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917), likewise
reaffirms Congress' power here, noting that "no alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all
statutory requirements are complied with." Fiallo reconciles this judicial deference with traditional
Equal Protection analysis by advocating a standard such that the citizenship statute will be upheld if the
reviewing court can discern a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for Congress' decision. 430
U.S. at 794. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (advocating an intermediate scrutiny
standard of review, mitigated by the deference traditionally accorded to military judgments, for sex-
related distinctions in a military context). Notably, however, the Fifth Circuit Nguyen panel declined to
adopt this plenary deference to Congress and Fiallo 's "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" stan-
dard - instead embarking strictly on a heightened intermediate scrutiny Equal Protection analysis. See
Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 535.
57. The O'Connor concurrence, Miller, 523 U.S. at 445, the Ginsburg dissent, id. at 460, and the
Breyer dissent, id. at 471, all point to at least five members of the Court who believe that the sex dis-
tinctions in Section 1409 do not survive heightened scrutiny. This point is obscured somewhat in the
opinion because not all these justices believe that Miller deserves this heightened scrutiny because her
father is not a named party, and she does not fulfill all the criteria of third party standing. Id. at 447
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting how Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) had recently articulated
the limits of third-party standing). Moreover, Justice Stevens' plurality opinion, joined by only Justice
Rehnquist, does believe that Section 1409(a) survives heightened scrutiny. Id. at 438.
58. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
59. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
60. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
61. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
62. 430 U.S. at 794.
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is now considerably higher than that existing when Fiallo63 was decided in the
immigration context, or even Rostker64 in the military context. This newer
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard, announced in U.S. v. Virginia and
reaffirmed in the O'Connor concurrence,65 Ginsburg dissent,66 and Breyer
dissent67 in Miller, requires an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex-
based distinctions that is also "substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. This standard is not that dissimilar from the strict standard used
in cases dealing with racial distinctions 69 and most certainly disallows the jus-
tifications advanced by Justice Stevens in Miller.
70
Under both theories, the Fifth Circuit Nguyen panel exhibits poor rea-
soning by conceding the third party standing issue to Nguyen and thus allow-
ing heightened scrutiny analysis of the statute without seriously considering the
ramifications of this level of scrutiny on the outcome of the constitutionality
issue. Likewise, the panel ignores interpretations of Miller from other Circuits
that note how Section 1409(a)'s sex distinctions do not survive a heightened
standard of analysis. 71 Both logical errors lead to an under-appreciation of the
strength of heightened intermediate scrutiny after Virginia and thus the im-
proper conclusion that Section 1409(a) does survive even heightened scrutiny
and is, as such, constitutional. However, this Case Note also argues that the
Fifth Circuit Nguyen panel did reach an outcome in denying citizenship to
Nguyen that will be supported by the Supreme Court.
While a polling of the individual justices in the fractured Miller opinion
does lead one to suspect a strong reaffirmation of Virginia's strong standard of
heightened intermediate scrutiny review in Nguyen, the more important poll
looks not at the standard of review, but rather at those who explicitly support a
remedy of severance of the two sub-provisions of Section 1409 that add addi-
63. 430 U.S. 787 (1987).
64. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (advocating deference to congressional military deci-
sions, even in the heightened intermediate standard context).
65. Miller, 523 U.S. at 446.
66. Id. at 460.
67. Id. at 471.
68. Mississippi Univ.for Women, 458 U.S. at 724.
69. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (noting that strict scrutiny re-
view is not "fatal in fact"); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (dis-
claiming that such review is "strict in theory and fatal in fact."). However, it is likewise useful to note
that no purposeful racial or ethnic classification has survived strict scrutiny since 1944.
70. Miller, 523 U.S. at 435.
71. E.g. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (using Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Miller as the foundation to conclude that where third-party standing
is not an issue, the Court will find Section 1409(a) unconstitutional). The Fifth Circuit panel is aware of
this case, however. They cite to it at Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 534. See also Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d
416, 425 (2000) (interpreting the Miller plurality opinion as supporting a heightened scrutiny level of
analysis for sex-based distinctions in citizenship and naturalization statutes).
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72tional citizenship transmission requirements for men. In this category, only
three justices explicitly support severance-the most likely remedy Nguyen
73faces to gain his U.S. citizenship. While acknowledging a right without a
remedy flies against the spirit of Marbury v. Madison,74 it likewise enables the
Court to not step back from the strong "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language of Virginia while still showing deference to Congress' plenary power
to regulate in the naturalization and citizenship area. The analysis here traces
this progression of the standard of scrutiny accorded statutes that discriminate
on the basis of sex through Virginia,75 and how this heightened standard will
impact the outcome of Nguyen's case.
The treatment of sex under the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment is best considered through the lens of one of the early cases to
76
strike down a statute on the basis of sex, Reed v. Reed. At issue was an Idaho
statute that gave preferences to males as administrators of estates, even when
an eligible female was equally qualified to act in that position.77 Noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment "does not deny to States the power to treat differ-
ent classes of persons in different ways," 78 the Court went on to prohibit dif-
ferent treatment "on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute. Using rational review, the Court found that this mandatory
preference given to members of one sex over another, "merely to accomplish
the elimination of hearings on the merits," 8  may not "lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex." 81 Though this language echoes strongly the very
distinctions faced by Nguyen in Section 1409(a), nearly all the members of the
Miller court found that the justifications advanced for the statute did in fact
survive this rational basis review.
82
Two years later in Frontiero,83 the Court embraced what can best be de-
72. Specifically, Section 1409(a)(3) adds the requirement that the citizen father agree in writing to
support the child until the age of 18. Section 1409(a)(4) requires that legitimation occur before the age
of 18.
73. Miller, 523 U.S. at 488-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer's dissent is joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg.
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,
66 (noting that the power to enforce implies the power to grant a remedy); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228 (1979) ("[W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.")
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
75. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
76. 404 U.S. 71(1971).
77. Idaho Code §§ 15-312, 15-314 (1979). One can presume that Idaho's premise here is that
women lack experience in business matters, especially relative to their male counterparts. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 (1976).
78. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
79. Id. at 76.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 77.
82. See supra note 53. See also Miller, 523 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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scribed as a strict scrutiny standard for evaluating these distinctions based upon
sex. In a four-member plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the
Court lumped sex-based classifications in with those based on race, alienage,
and national origin, finding all as worthy of being "subjected to close judicial
scrutiny." 84 Noting that sex, like the traditional Equal Protection suspect
statuses of race and national origin, is both immutable and "frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society," Justice Brennan's plu-
rality opinion draws on Reed's foundations to pronounce sex as one of the key
statuses protected by strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 85 But not until Craig v. Boren three years
later did sex receive its modem status as deserving of heightened intermedi-
ate-and not strict-scrutiny. 86 Perhaps lowering the bar somewhat in order to
gain a majority opinion 87 for heightened scrutiny for sex, 88 Craig strikes
down the state of Oklahoma's use of drunk-driving statistics to justify restric-
tions on alcohol sales to young males but not young females as "not substan-
tially related to the achievement of the statutory objective. 89
The point of this brief history of the level of scrutiny accorded to sex-
based statutory classifications is to highlight that intermediate scrutiny is in
fact a much more fluid standard than is commonly assumed.90 The more mod-
em pronouncement on heightened intermediate scrutiny accorded to sex-based
differences is United States v. Virginia.91 While taking care to distinguish sex
from the strict scrutiny accorded race or national origin-based classifications,
the opinion limits the sex-based classifications to those that serve "important
84. Id. at 682.
85. Id. at 686-87.
86. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
87. Note that Frontiero was only a plurality opinion.
88. A logical extension of some of Reva Siegel's arguments is that Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), perhaps made it possible for the Court in Craig to establish this majority support for height-
ened intermediate status for sex-based discrimination by removing pregnancy and other sex-based per-
formances from consideration under this standard. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A His-
torical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261,
268-70, 355 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2190, 2195 n. 281 (1996); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:
FederalAntidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,448 n.29, 504
n.282, 521 (2000).
89. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
90. Other key cases supporting this point include: Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (dis-
allowing an Equal Protection claim that the Social Security Act unfairly advantages women over men in
calculating retirement benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (setting aside a state statute using sex
as a proxy for need by requiring husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down a state statute allowing unwed mothers to block the adop-
tion of their child by withholding consent, but not giving unwed fathers this same privilege). Cf JE.B.,
511 U.S. 127 (1994) (noting that while the intermediate scrutiny test may not provide a clear standard in
all cases, it still makes clear a strong presumption that sex classifications are invalid); Mississippi Univ.
for Women, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (noting that the burden ofjustification is demanding and rests entirely
on the state).
91. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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governmental objectives," 92 with means "substantially related" to the ends, 93
the justification genuine, 94 not relying on "overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females," 95 and with
the state bearing the burden to prove these justifications. 96 Namely, the Court
builds on J.E.B.97 to strengthen this intermediate scrutiny standard certainly
beyond that of Reed and Craig, such that it is closer to the often-fatal strict
scrutiny analysis.
98
Differences, though, do exist between the sexes. 99 Gender theorists, as
well as those dealing with issues of race and other protected statuses, have split
on whether equal protection can better be achieved by highlighting these dif-
ferences rather than promoting an inaccurate sameness.00  The Court itself
hasn't been much more consistent. In Miller, Justice Stevens' plurality opinion
seems to identify pregnancy as one of the substantial real differences between
the sexes. lo Yet Geduldig, decided in 1974-just before Stevens was nomi-
nated to the Court-highlights the distinction between discrimination based on
sex and discrimination based on pregnancy, and notes that pregnancy-based
92. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Mississippi Univ.for Women, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) and
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
93. Id.
94. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975)).
95. Id. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724.
97. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (holding that sex-based peremptory challenges in
jury selection fail this heightened intermediate standard and thus violate the Equal Protection clause).
98. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And the rationale of today's decision is
sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistin-
guishable from strict scrutiny."). This claim gains some credence from the Court's recent pronounce-
ment on strict scrutiny in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). There, the Court
held that strict scrutiny of race or national origin did not necessarily entail that such classifications
would be "fatal in fact" to constitutionality of the statute in question. Id. at 237. See Patricia A. Carl-
son, Recent Development: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Lochnerization of Affirmative Ac-
tion, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 423 (1996). In Adarand, Justice Stevens noted that it is anomalous to use both
levels of review treating race and sex differently when addressing a singular affirmative action program.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also notes that "when a court be-
comes preoccupied with abstract standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal con-
sistency. Id. See also Eric C. Milby, Note, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Signaling the End of
Affirmative Action, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 263, 320-21 (1996) (noting that applying strict scrutiny to
sex-based classifications would "require the Court to either repudiate the position that sex is not a 'sus-
pect' class or to break from the analytical framework that equates 'quasi-suspect' classes with interme-
diate scrutiny.").
99. "The two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different
from a community composed of both." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
100. See supra note 9. Note also the role ofperformativity in fashioning identity. See, e.g., Rogers
v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (disallowing the link between corn rows
and race); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing a lower court's determination
that the harsher penalty provisions applicable to crack relative to cocaine deprived blacks of equal pro-
tection); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (affirming the New York Court of Appeals'
determination that striking jurors on account of their ability to speak Spanish did not constitute uncon-
stitutional race-based voir dire decisions); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (noting that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute sex-based discrimination).
101. Miller, 523 U.S. at 433.
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discrimination does not violate the Equal Protection clause. 10 2 Likewise,
Califano v. Webster endorsed the use of sex in distinguishing Social Security
benefit levels so that women may be compensated somewhat for their lower
earnings in their career. 10 3 But determining whether sex-based classifications
are used to promote equal opportunity or perpetuate the inferiority of women
(or men) is rarely so straightforward. 104 Difference or not, this tension has
largely been resolved in much of the Court's post-1980 jurisprudence in favor
of treating the sexes the same regardless of the remedial intentions involved. 
105
Though the difference issue pervades Equal Protection caselaw and is ulti-
mately determinative of whether given distinctions will survive heightened in-
termediate scrutiny review, the strengthening of the heightened intermediate
scrutiny standard from Reed through Virginia minimizes the impact of high-
lighted differences. Gender theorists may still promote difference as the key to
achieving equality, but the Court's jurisprudence has largely abandoned this
approach.
The strongest argument that the rationales given by Stevens in Miller and
relied upon by the Fifth Circuit panel in Nguyen do not survive heightened in-
termediate scrutiny, is that at least five members of the Court in Miller have
seriously undercut Section 1409(a)'s justifications. 0 6 Justice Breyer's dissent
is particularly potent in dissecting Justice Stevens' rationales10 7 for the sex-
based distinctions of Section 1409(a). 108 He begins with the statute's require-
ment that paternity be established before the child reaches the age of 18-the
key to why Nguyen's father cannot simply establish paternity and transmit his
citizenship now. This can be justified on the grounds of accuracy of paternity
information, a point largely diminished by modern DNA testing. 10 9 Likewise,
the claim that this requirement insures the establishment of relationships and
ties-to the father and the United States-falls away on grounds of lack of
102. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974).
103. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
104. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987). See also Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
105. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[A]s the law currently stands, the Court will apply 'intermediate scrutiny' to cases of invidious gender
discrimination ... while applying the same standard for benign classifications as for invidious ones.").
See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th
Cir. 1996); Francis Achampong, The Evolution of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law: A Critical Ex-
amination of the Latest Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment Litigation, 73 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 701, 711 (1999).
106. See supra note 53. Notably, the O'Connor concurrence, Miller, 523 U.S. at 445, the Ginsburg
dissent, id. at 460, and the Breyer dissent, id. at 471, all take this view.
107. Again, the statelessness and dual nationality justifications for Section 1409(a) are not stressed
in Justice Breyer's dissent in Miller. It is a safe bet, however, that these justifications will play a more
prominent role in the Court's decision in Nguyen's case.
108. Miller, 523 U.S. at 484-88.
109. Id. (citing Shapiro, Reifler, and Psome, The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Pa-
ternity Action, 7 J. LAW & HEALTH 1, 29 (1992-1993)).
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tailoring and proportionality to the issue at hand.110 Boulais raised Nguyen
practically from birth-in the United States--certainly fulfilling all the ethical
mandates of this justification, but did not comply simply because he did not
realize the import of complying with the statute before Nguyen reached the age
of 18."'
Yet no matter how much homage the Court pays to this heightened stan-
dard of scrutiny from Virginia, a better measure of the actual status of height-
ened intermediate scrutiny may be what relief Nguyen is finally afforded. Jus-
tice Scalia's Miller concurrence provides what this Case Note argues will be
the controlling rationale in this case-that the Court is unable to sever the of-
fending provisions of Section 1409 and confer citizenship upon Nguyen.
l l1
Scalia begins by distinguishing the distinctions in Section 1409 from the
normal equal protection case; the statute simply does not subject one class to a
restriction from which the other class is exempt. 113 Where both classes are
subject to restrictions from which the other is exempt-as in Section 1409-
eliminating one set of restrictions goes no further in advancing the mandates of
the Equal Protection clause regarding the other class. 114 This quandary would
leave the Court with having to choose between striking the limitations for both
sexes, leaving no restrictions upon the citizenship of illegitimate children, or
simply denying naturalization to all legitimate children.
Some of this conflict was foreshadowed in INS v. Pangilinan, which held
that a "court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship."
' 1 5
Since courts are 'then "without authority to sanction changes or
modifications"'1 6 from the "terms and conditions specified by Congress"
'1 17
regarding the conferral of citizenship, the severance debate can be crystallized
into whether Congress had intended severability in case part of the statute were
held unconstitutional. Scalia points to Section 1421(d) of the statute, which
mandates that citizenship may only be conferred "under the conditions
prescribed in this subchapter and not otherwise."1 18 A general severance
clause does govern the entire act 19-one in which Breyer's dissenting opinion
110. Id. at485.
111. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
112. Miller, 523 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 458 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 129, 191-192 (1976)). Namely, illegitimate chil-
dren of citizen-fathers must meet the requirements of Section 1409(a) from which the illegitimate chil-
dren of citizen-mothers are exempt, and illegitimate children of citizen mothers must meet the different
requirements of Section 1409(c), from which the illegitimate children of citizen fathers are exempt. Id.
114. Id. at 459.
115. 486 U.S. 875, 884 (1988). Later, the opinion takes an even harsher stand. "Neither by appli-
cation of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a
court have the power to confer citizenship in violation of [statutory] limitations. Id. at 885. See also
Rogers v. Bellai, 401 U.S. at 830 ("[T]he Court has specifically recognized the power of Congress not to
grant a United States citizen the right to transmit citizenship by descent.").
116. United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917).
117. Id.
118. Miller, 523 U.S. at 457 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 142 1(d)) (emphasis added).
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tire act' 19-- one in which Breyer's dissenting opinion places great stock in de-
ciding to award relief. 120 But Scalia's argument that the more specific Section
1421(d)'s call for non-severability governs the Act-wide general severability
clause is strong121 and is only explicitly rebutted by three members of the
court. 12 2 And with non-severability governing the statute, Nguyen's call for
citizenship under Virginia's heightened intermediate scrutiny will in all likeli-
hood be met with deaf ears.
Is sex really more important now? From the standpoint of whether Vir-
ginia's123 very strong "exceedingly persuasive justification" language remains
the governing standard for sex-based classifications above and beyond that re-
quired in early heightened intermediate scrutiny cases, then the answer is a re-
sounding yes. The citizenship statute at issue here effectively equates sex with
financial support and caretaking-two generalizations that are expressly im-
permissible under the Court's recent jurisprudence. 124 The Fifth Circuit panel
in Nguyen allows heightened intermediate scrutiny analysis of the Section
1409(a) statute without fully taking into account the broad implications of such
a standard. 125 Moreover, the panel ignores the Ninth Circuit's Ahumada-
Aguilar126 and the Third Circuit's Breyer127-both noting how these sex dis-
tinctions in the citizenship laws do not survive the heightened intermediate
level of scrutiny. These mistakes wrongly lead the Fifth Circuit to conclude
that Section 1409 survives Equal Protection heightened intermediate scrutiny
and Nguyen is subject to deportation as a non-citizen. The end-game of this
constitutional error, though, is minimal, as Nguyen will likely be denied relief
on the grounds that the Court is unable to sever the statute and thus grant him
citizenship. As such, from the more practical relief-oriented standpoint of
whether sex is more important now, the answer is only when the strong Vir-
ginia standard of heightened intermediate scrutiny doesn't clash other impor-
tant objectives-notably the deference to Congress accorded to the areas of
naturalization, immigration, and the military, among others.
119. 66 Stat. 281, § 406. See also "Separability," Note, following 8 U.S.C. § 1101, p. 38.
120. Miller, 523 U.S. at 489-490.
121. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-385 (1992).
122. Notably, Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 489 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
123. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
124. See JE.B., 511 U.S. at 139, n. 11 (invalidating sex-based peremptory challenges "[e]ven ifa
measure of truth can be found in some of the sex stereotypes used to justify them"); Miller, 523 U.S. at
487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542, 546).
125. Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 534. Note that the standing issues behind this choice of level of scrutiny
are not discussed at length here, largely because Boulais (Nguyen's father) is a named party in this suit
and presumably negates all the standing issues Justice O'Connor had in Miller.
126. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1125. See supra note 71.
127. Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416 (2000). See supra note 71.

